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Welcome by chief education 
officer christian forestier, 
Administrator General 
of the Conservatoire national 
des arts et métiers (CNAM)
Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues and 
friends, we would like to thank Jean-Pierre 
and chairman Jouzel for asking us to host 
this seminar.
 
I am of course flattered by your choice, 
because the nature of the CNAM is consubs-
tantial with the topic chosen for your two-
day conference. For those who are unfami-
liar with this institution, the CNAM is over 
two hundred years old. It was created during 
the French Revolution by abbot Grégoire. 
I actually took charge of the CNAM just over 
two months ago but I have known the insti-
tution for nearly forty years. The CNAM has 
been in these premises from the outset. It 
is the only major French higher education 
institution to remain in its original premises 
in the centre of Paris.  
 
With over 100,000 affiliated students per 
year, the CNAM more than fulfils its main 
mission of life-long education. Our affiliated 
students are mainly adults – mostly young 
adults – but they are not students in the 
strict sense of the term. They are scatte-
red across the globe as the CNAM has bases 
throughout France, including overseas ter-
ritories. This enabled one of my predeces-
sors, the Chief Education Officer Mr Saurel, 
to claim that: « The sun never sets on the 
CNAM ».  Approximately 10,000 people teach 
at the CNAM every year for varying amounts 
of time. We have a consolidated budget of 
over 150 million euros. For a long time it was 
almost entirely devoted to engineering. To-
day, as a sign of the times, 40% are devoted 
to engineering and 60% to human, social, 
economic and management sciences. Like 
all higher education institutions, we have a 
mission to undertake research projects. Our 
actual projects demonstrate a strong bias 
towards technological research with regard 
to industry and business. Last but not least, 
we have a mission to raise awareness of 
scientific and technological culture focused 
on this magnificent part of the Conserva-
toire – its museum. This museum is one of 
the distinctive characteristics of the Conser-
vatoire. We might even be tempted to think 
that the CNAM, a fully itemized comparison 
not withstanding, is almost without equal in 
the world on account of its three-fold mis-
sion of education, research and populariza-
















 Your topic for these two days goes right 
to the heart of our mission here. Just consi-
der this: a few weeks ago, Professor Jouzel 
and I opened the exhibition on climate-rela-
ted issues which you have just seen. A few 
days before, there was a major conference 
on the future of nuclear energy…
Thank you all for coming. I am very ho-
noured and very pleased to be taking part 
in this event, which I hope will be a great 
success. 
danièle hervieu-léger
The choice of speakers is probably linked 
to our setting since we are welcoming under 
our roof a physicist, a hard scientist, and a 
sociologist of religion. There is, therefore, 
certain logic to this. What is the object of 
the exercise? I suggest that the question 
being asked here is why science is perhaps 
not really popular, or at the very least 
arouses suspicion, in contemporary societies 
governed in many ways by technology and 
scientific knowledge. 
As someone who specializes in belief, 
which I assume is why I have been invited, 
I will try to explain the feeling of wariness 
which is felt towards science, a symptom of 
which is the decline in the number of people 
opting to work in science. I think that it is 
necessary to make an initial observation: we 
are no longer dealing with a confrontation 
between science on the one hand and belief 
systems on the other with cosmologies and 
explanations of the world which would be 
antagonistic to and in conflict with science 
which tries to debunk them. This conflict 
between belief and science has been 
extremely prominent and has served to fuel 
suspicion of science in the past. We have 
moved beyond that – if only because science 
has emerged victorious. It has called into 
question the claims of major religions to 
speak the truth about the world, its history, 
its future and its origins. This does not, 
however, mean that science has solved 
all our problems and I shall come to this 
shortly. However, we have moved beyond the 
great conflicts and major debates between 
belief and science. You might think this 
strange at a time when much is being said 
about creationism. However, as far as I am 
concerned, as a sociologist of religions, I feel 
that we are on the tail of a comet which does 
not really involve the secularization of the 
world in which we live. A number of believers 
on the fringes whose aim, amongst other 
things, is to question the autonomy of the 
Science in Society: Dialogues and Scientific Responsibility
#59
135
modern world on every front starting with 
politics, have indeed taken up this theme, 
but this is not the source of the suspicion we 
are experiencing today.
My second point is that this suspicion does 
not, in my opinion, stem from arrogance 
on the part of science which would now 
claim to have the answer to every question. 
We are no longer part of the 19th century 
optic in which science, which bore the weight 
of a great deal of belief in science, dreamed 
of unifying all knowledge and providing a 
global answer to all of man’s questions. On 
the contrary, we are faced with a science 
which is perfectly aware that it is reducing 
the number of questions and forcing people 
to frame new questions, whilst realizing the 
limitations of its own theories which are in 
fact being continuously challenged by new 
advances. We are no longer, therefore, loo-
king at an arrogant science claiming to have 
the last word or the final say on the meaning 
of human existence. What we have, on the 
contrary, are SEVERAL sciences, which are 
conscious of the unique nature of their view 
of reality and which are well aware that they 
create uncertainty, even as they shed light 
on the darkness of the other world.
This is perhaps the issue that is of in-
terest to us. Therefore, this science, which 
operates whilst having in a sense abando-
ned the scientistic outlook of dispensing 
with broad metaphysical issues, and which 
has limited its own scope not in terms of 
knowledge but by promoting the idea that 
there are several ways of accessing reality, 
is a science which simultaneously presents 
itself as being extremely powerful and cap-
able of progress, whilst remaining very mo-
dest insofar as it recognizes and deals with 
the limitations of its own arguments. This 
does not mean that all scientific truths are 
relative. It means that they are located in 
a particular range of experiments. Because 
science has achieved this extraordinary level 
of development, it can step back from itself, 
which clearly distinguishes it from certain 
scientistic visions of the last century. This is 
the very reason for which suspicion arises. 
For those observing extraordinary scientific 
developments, there is the feeling that in 
fact science, which is advancing and giving 
us greater mastery over the world, is begin-
ning to create uncertainty and is forcing us 
to consider this uncertainty as a given fact 
of our condition. The fundamental problem 
is that when science itself demonstrates 
that it is creating as much uncertainty as 
certainty, then this approach to science 
does not simply try to identify gaps in our 
knowledge, but also considers uncertainty 
to be a dimension of reality in itself. There-
fore, it instils in us deep uncertainty about 
our ability to raise issues and, in particular, 
to find answers. This is the uncertain posi-
tion in which we find ourselves, and I think 
that this goes a long way towards explaining 
what I would call the ambivalence rather than 
the suspicion of society towards science. 
Ambivalence, which oscillates between fas-
cination on the one hand, and fear of what 



















contemplate the implacable nature of uncer-
tainty. This is the ambivalence, which as a 
sociologist of religions, I observe in those 
new religious movements so obsessed by 
the issue of science and by the hope of sta-
bilising their vision of the world once and for 
all through science.
Facing up to this situation lies not only in 
making science attractive, accessible, and 
appealing. The issue before us is essentially 
one of educating and socialising ourselves 
and socialising the younger generation to 
accept a position of uncertainty which in-
cludes the expectations which we have of 
science. This is a position of uncertainty 
which implies, for example, knowing how to 
accommodate the way in which knowledge is 
constructed. In other words, the issue with 
scientific education is not only showing what 
science is doing in order to make it attrac-
tive, but it is as much about incorporating 
the history of knowledge into our intellec-
tual training. This is not just about events, 
although museums and science fairs are im-
portant. The real issue, I believe, is to esta-
blish a proper relationship with science for 
the very reason that it can both change our 
world and our lives and leave us to contem-
plate our uncertainty without leading us 
by the hand. This could form the basis of a 
scientific education, a daily task which must 
be enshrined in the way in which science 
is taught in schools. I believe that the only 
way to ward off the possible resurgence of 
obscurantism which turns this uncertainty 
to its advantage is to take into account the 
historical dimension of science, the History 
of science.
etienne Klein
I am going to attempt to talk to you not 
as a sociologist but as a physicist who has 
spent several years trying to take part in 
what is called the propagation of science 
and technology according to the recei-
ved terminology, which I find rather cold. I 
would like to share a few thoughts with you 
drawn from this work which could be termed 
education and popularisation. The reason I 
undertook this work was that as a student I 
quickly became fascinated by the efficiency 
of mathematics in physics. Physics has been 
using the language of mathematics since 
Galileo, and the result of this epistemolo-
gical break which consists of saying that 
nature is described in mathematical terms, 
means that several centuries later we can 
recount in a fairly detailed manner and with 
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great accuracy the last 13.7 billion years of 
our planet. This science - physics - to which 
I shall restrict myself, is now able to pre-
dict the existence of new types of physical 
objects not from observation, but from ar-
guments which have mathematics as their 
starting point, and which, when projected 
onto the world, enable us to predict the 
existence of objects which are as strange, 
at least initially, as intermediary bosons or 
antimatter. Mathematics in physics act as an 
ontological winch. Moreover, physics, espe-
cially in the twentieth century, has shown 
itself capable of producing results which 
some have called negative philosophical 
discoveries. This does not mean that phy-
sics is challenging philosophy or aiming to 
dethrone it, but that it presents arguments 
on certain philosophical issues which point 
towards possible answers, or even contest 
some of them. As a result, knowledge achie-
ved by such means also has its own intrinsic 
value, which has nothing to do with the ap-
plications which can be derived from it. For 
example, the theory of relativity or quantum 
physics would have had the same value as 
today as tools for knowledge, even if they 
had not had any technological by-products. 
This is far from being the case, as lasers, 
Satnav, and transistors are applications of 
this research. However, their main value lies 
in the fact that they altered our knowledge 
of reality or of time and space. 
It seemed to me that this message should 
be shared with the majority of people not 
in a spirit of democracy, but because I felt 
that people were not interested in these is-
sues as they had never had the opportunity 
to meet people able to discuss them with 
them. This is what set me off on a fairly long 
period of popularisation which brought me 
into contact with different audiences, not 
just students. I realized that there was in-
deed a problem with science, that things 
were sticking, and that relationships were 
not fluid. I realized that they could be vio-
lent, tense, or even cruel, and that at the 
end of the day each individual has their own 
issue with science. It is not society which 
has a problem with science, but the indivi-
dual. Some people find it too complex and 
incomprehensible. Others think that it is a 
selection criterion for studies rather than 
something which teaches us something 
about our world. Other people think that it 
is dangerous, and others claim that nobody 
is guiding it and that it is creating a world in 
which the future is completely uncertain and 
runs the risk of ending in disaster. Others 
think that it does not shed any light on mea-
ning and at the end of the day only provi-
des answers to questions which fall within 
its scope – i.e. scientific questions – leaving 
aside those which are most important for us, 
i.e. those relating to values, to what helps us 
to live together as community, how to esta-
blish justice and to view freedom, etc.
 I think that the theme of science and 
society which is bringing us together over 
these two days is a means of marking the 
existence of the issue. Giving the problem 













us to progress towards analysing it. Science 
or the sciences are intrinsically complica-
ted. What is science? What are the criteria 
which set the limits of it and its ends? These 
are already all very complicated questions. 
What is society? That is also very complica-
ted. Are we dealing with society as we see 
it or as our political representatives depict 
it? Are we dealing with the society that we 
see in the daily opinion polls which we take? 
Or is society what is expressed by minority 
groups such as those fighting the use of GM 
crops, the campaign for the return of the 
Latin mass, or who knows what else. What is 
society in this context? The paradoxical ele-
ment of this theme is that whenever we take 
two complex words – society on the one hand 
and science on the other – we are always 
hopeful that we can make them interact and 
that through some miracle of anti-destruc-
tive interference bringing two problems to-
gether will yield one simple problem. I do 
not think this is the case – the problem is 
even more complicated than knowing what 
science and society are. It seems to me that 
the point of the seminar is to try to unders-
tand what we are setting against each other 
when we bring these two terms together. For 
example, is the aim of this sort of thinking to 
understand and define scientists’ responsi-
bilities in the face of the potential or conse-
quences of their work? On the contrary, or 
in addition, is it a question of working to 
make scientific and technological develop-
ments more socially acceptable? Is it a case 
of putting science into culture? Is it a case 
of thinking of how to promote, communicate 
and teach it? My particular interest is this 
question of science teaching and education 
and I get the impression that we still have a 
long way to go. It seems to me that teaching 
science at every level - primary, secondary 
and university - is becoming an increasin-
gly difficult task. This is not because science 
has become more difficult than before – this 
is not the case – but because young people 
today have a very different set of references 
from those teaching them and because there 
is a cultural difference which makes trans-
mission of information even more difficult. 
If this type of seminar could help us to un-
derstand the most appropriate way of talk-
ing about science, i.e. by acknowledging the 
death of scientism and by trying to combat 
relativism in its more extreme forms, then I 
feel that we will have made progress. 
